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Abstract: Human rights abuses resulting from Canadian mining operations in Latin America have increasingly surfaced, and new, bold paths
of accountability are being forged. However, this is not the end. Few regulations exist for mine closure, a process that itself can leave devastation
in the communities affected. In this Comment, I ground my analysis in
the facts and history of the Marlin Mine in western Guatemala. I set forth
the structural barriers to justice posed by multinational corporations with
operations abroad, and discuss two possible routes for accountability in
relation to mine closure. First, within the universal human rights system,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
157
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offers some hope through the expansion of its extraterritorial application,
particularly in relation to third parties. Second, I explore possibilities
within the Inter-American human rights system, including progress in
terms of environmental rights and the extraterritorial application of human rights. I conclude with a reflection on the appropriateness of human
rights law as a mechanism of accountability for these abuses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open pit mining, as the name suggests, can be environmentally devastating. Its name in Spanish, however, tells the story from a different
perspective: la minería a cielo abierto, which loosely translates to “open
sky mining.”1 In this paper, I trace new possibilities within international
human rights law for holding multinational corporations (MNCs) accountable for environmental damage abroad, a goal which has been elusive within the human rights regime.2 To be clear, I do not argue that the
available human rights protection mechanisms are sufficient – an open
pit mine is an open pit mine whether it faces the stars or not. Rather, I
outline developments that, when strung together, indicate an opening for
the kind of accountability that has thus far been nearly impossible to secure. Whether these developments will actually lead to accountability,
despite the structural barriers in place preventing this kind of justice, remains an open question.
To remove this analysis from the realm of the abstract, I anchor my
discussion in the closure of the Marlin Mine in Guatemala. The Marlin
Mine was a gold mine operated by a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goldcorp Inc., a Canadian company, which uses a combination of open pit and
underground mining techniques.3 It closed in 2017 and left a legacy of

* J.D., UCLA School of Law. My gratitude to Charis Kamphuis for the unwavering encouragement,
and all my Justice and Corporate Accountability Project colleagues for their valuable feedback.
Sincere thanks to the editors of Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
for providing thoughtful edits and support.
1. Similarly, rather than lie on your back, in Spanish you lie boca arriba, or mouth up. In
both instances you find yourself in a vulnerable position; in the second, however, you might have
something to say about it.
2. See, e.g., Anna Grear & Burns H. Weston, The Betrayal of Human Rights and the Urgency
of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a Post-Kiobel Lawscape, 15 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 21, 25-26, 32 (2015).
3. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF
GOLDCORP’S MARLIN MINE 4, 9 (2010), https://www.goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress
.com/2010/07/ocg_hra_exec_summary.pdf.
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ongoing environmental and social damage.4 Since human rights law focuses, naturally, on humans, my analysis folds environmental damage
into the framework of economic, social, and cultural rights.5
In Part II, I set forth the structural barriers to justice posed by MNCs
with operations abroad. In Part III, I review the facts and history of the
Marlin Mine, specifically focusing on the interconnectedness of environmental, economic, social, and cultural harms related to closure. With this
foundation, in Part IV I discuss the possibilities for accountability within
a universal human rights system through the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the expansion of
its extraterritorial application, particularly in relation to third parties. Part
V explores possibilities within the Inter-American human rights system,
including progress in terms of environmental rights and the extraterritorial application of human rights. I conclude with a reflection on the appropriateness of human rights law as an accountability mechanism for
these abuses.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
It is notoriously difficult to hold MNCs accountable for abuses committed outside their country of origin. Although this paper will not focus
on these structural barriers, it is important to describe this underlying
framework in order to assess whether certain legal developments have the
capacity to promote justice and disrupt these structural barriers to accountability.

4. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., MARLIN MINE AT CLOSURE: A REVIEW OF GOLDCORP
COMMITMENTS TO THE 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT 84 (2017); Frente de Defensa San Miguelense (FREDEMI, The Front in Defense of San Miguel Ixtahuacán), Specific Instance Complaint Submitted to the Canadian National Contact Point Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises Concerning: The Operations of Goldcorp Inc. at the Marlin Mine in the
Indigenous Community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán, Guatemala, CTR. FOR INT’L ENV’T L. 10-12
(Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.ciel.org/Publications/FREDEMI_SpecificInstanceComplaint_
December%202009.pdf (outlining damage including, among others, skin abnormalities in children,
contaminated water, dried up springs, broken homes, bridges and roads, and dead cattle). Goldcorp’s understanding of the closure was, predictably, different: “While Goldcorp and Montana
have, in general, made great strides in implementing the recommendations proposed by OCG [ON
COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3], gaps remain. Some cannot be fulfilled,
given that the mine’s closure is underway and opportunities for action are now limited.”
5. This relationship is particularly important in the context of mine closure. UYANGA
GANKHUYAG & FABRICE GREGOIRE, MANAGING MINING FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A
SOURCEBOOK 17 (Andy Quan ed., 2018) (“Since mining often takes place in peripheral, less developed regions and locations, the socio-economic impact of mine closure can heavily impact local
communities”); Vlado Vivoda, Deanna Kemp & John Owen, Regulating the Social Aspects of Mine
Closure in Three Australian States, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 2-3 (2019).
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The development of the modern corporation in the U.S. happened,
not coincidentally, alongside the expansion of the public sphere after the
Civil War.6 That is, just as the enslavement of Black people came to a
legal end, the private sphere expanded in order to continue to exclude
newly freed Black communities from means of accumulating capital.7
This interpretation aligns with contemporary understandings of the moment; for example, W.E.B. Du Bois’ description of the post-Civil War
amendments period as “a brief moment in the sun” for Black Americans
who “then moved back again toward slavery”.8 At the same time, mechanisms were being developed to undo paths for inclusion, such as the civil
rights cases’ gutting of the Civil War amendments.9 In Canada, a similar
movement toward the consolidation of corporate power was taking
place.10 Considering that many white Canadians feared an influx of Black
Americans into Canada as a result of the Civil War,11 while harboring
explicitly racist attitudes towards the Black Canadian community,12 the
U.S. analysis of corporate history is relevant to Canada. Understanding
the corporation as a means of entrenching existing power relations helps
uncover at a theoretical level why corporate accountability is so difficult.
To add another level to this structural analysis, international law itself can pose a barrier to justice. I focus on international law here because
it is the primary justice mechanism for abuses conducted outside of an
6. See Amanda Werner, Corporations Are (White) People: How Corporate Privilege Reifies
Whiteness as Property, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 129, 134-35 (2015); ADAM WINKLER,
WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS xv (2018) (“At
the same time the [Supreme Court] was upholding Jim Crow laws . . . the justices were invalidating
minimum-wage laws, curtailing collective bargaining efforts, voiding manufacturing restrictions
. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted to shield the former slaves from discrimination, had
been transformed into a sword used by corporations to strike at unwanted regulation”).
7. Werner, supra note 6, at 135 (“Because the power to exclude is so central to the white
identity, when the Civil War amendments forced whites to share the public space, they responded
by situating many of their interests in the private sphere and erecting the arbitrary barrier of state
action to keep blacks out”).
8. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880 30 (Free Press, 1st
ed. 1998).
9. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
10. HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CANADA: VOLUME III: ADDRESSING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
1891-1961, at 13-14 (Donald Kerr & Deryck W. Holdsworth eds., 1990).
11. See ROBIN W. WINKS, BLACKS IN CANADA: A HISTORY 288-92 (1997). A second wave
of fear arose at the turn of the century when Canadians realized that many of the newcomers and
their children would likely remain in Canada permanently, rather than return during Reconstruction
as they had previously assumed. Id. at 289-92.
12. See, e.g., Matthew Furrow, Samuel Gridley Howe, the Black Population of Canada West,
and the Racial Ideology of the “Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction,” 97 J. AM. HIST. 344, 356
(2010); GREG MARQUIS, ARMAGEDDON’S SHADOW: THE CIVIL WAR AND CANADA’S MARITIME
PROVINCES 59-84 (1998).
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MNC’s country of origin.13 But international law is not neutral: “it was
only because of colonialism that international law became universal; and
the dynamic of difference, the civilising mission, that produced this result, continues into the present.”14 For example, the law’s characterization
of original inhabitants as “inferior” legitimized conquest; at the same
time, however, in many cases these “inferior” individuals were nonetheless able to enter treaties handing territories over to Europeans.15 Ultimately, much of international law was developed to serve colonial interests.16
This process did not end with decolonization. Decolonization simply
meant that colonialism was replaced by neocolonialism.17 In other words,
a blanket was thrown over the structural inequality that was a direct result
of colonialism, effectively hushing any protest that the cessation of colonialism, and the grant of “rights” presumed to accompany it, did not necessarily dismantle the systems creating inequality. A similar hushing of
inequality was the basis of undermining the Civil Rights amendments in
the U.S. context.18
Pulling these two dimensions together, B.S. Chimini notes that “a
whole host of international laws seek to free transnational capital of spatial and temporal constraints.”19 Chimini discusses, for example, the
13. Space has certainly opened (and closed, in the U.S. context) for domestic remedies. See,
e.g., Brian Sableman, Note, Ending Alien Tort Statute Exceptionalism: Corporate Liability in the
Wake of Jesner v. Arab Bank and Implications for U.S. Private Military Contractors, 63 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 349, 364 (2019). For a more hopeful future on domestic remedies in the Canadian context,
see Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya [2020] 5 S.C.R (Can.), also discussed below.
14. Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities,
27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 742 (2006).
15. Id. at 745.
16. See James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network,
and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 passim (2011) (giving an overview of scholars exploring this connection extensively).
17. Anghie, supra note 14, at 749; B. S. Chimini, Third World Approaches to International
Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 3, 14 (2006) (“Poor and rich states are to be treated alike
in the new century and the principle of special and differential treatment is to be slowly but surely
discarded”).
18. The U.S. Supreme Court stated just 15 years after the passage of the Civil Rights amendments, “[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws.”
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). This false baseline continues to be a tool of dismantling civil rights. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (“The clock of
our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868 . . . . It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree
of protection greater than that accorded others”).
19. Chimini, supra note 17, at 9 n.25.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

162

8/16/21 8:01 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 44:2

“internationalization of property rights” for the benefit of MNC operations,20 the jurisdictional limits of international law,21 the increased influence of MNCs in developing international law,22 and increased MNC
funding for the United Nations.23 The interplay between neocolonialism
and corporate exceptionalism is deeply relevant to the history of the
Americas.24
This paper focuses on the potential of international human rights law
to address environmental abuses through the lens of economic, social,
and cultural rights. Human rights law has been criticized for simply maintaining the status quo, for reasons related to the development of international law outlined above.25 While this is a valid critique, I, perhaps optimistically, trace recent developments in human rights that may disrupt
this stagnation.26 Concretely, I use the closure of the Marlin Mine in
Western Guatemala as an example of ongoing injustice to argue that
changing human rights norms indicate Canada can no longer hide under
the aforementioned blanket, and to underscore the urgency of interpreting
these legal developments in this way.

20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id. at 14.
24. The extraction of free labor from enslaved Africans in the U.S. and the Americas more
broadly was an essential piece of the colonial logic that is the foundation of racial capitalism. See
generally CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL
TRADITION (U. of N. Carolina Press 2d ed., 2000) (1983).
25. Chimini himself criticizes the way human rights law centers property rights to the benefit
of MNCs and to the detriment of Third World peoples. Chimini, supra note 17, at 12. See also
Tshepo Madlingozi, Social Justice in a Time of Neo-Apartheid Constitutionalism: Critiquing the
Anti-Black Economy of Recognition, Incorporation and Distribution, 28 STELLENBOSCH L. REV.
123, 136 (2017) (Human rights “cannot dislodge white supremacy, institutional racism and structural exclusion and invisibility”); Anna Spain Bradley, Human Rights Racism, 32 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 1, 58 (2019) (“Naming the challenge as human rights racism aims to illuminate the depth
of the problem and to reveal the ways that international human rights law is not racially neutral”).
This is by no means a new critique; for example, practitioners and scholars of liberation theology
in the last century have denounced the Western vision of human rights, which focuses excessively
on the individual and obscures the collective harms that imperial and neo-imperial relations have
imposed on the Third World. PHILLIP BERRYMAN, LIBERATION THEOLOGY: ESSENTIAL FACTS
ABOUT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND BEYOND 115-18 (Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr. ed., 1987). On individualism versus collectivism, see also MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN
RIGHTS A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 71 (2002).
26. “Can anything be done to redeem the human rights corpus, as well as its movement and
discourse? I think so . . . The current corpus is largely a product of the West . . . . It is only from a
healthy intercourse of different types of knowledge that a new human rights project can emerge.”
MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: HEGEMONY, LAW, AND POLITICS viii (2016).
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III. CASE STUDY: THE MARLIN MINE
The Marlin Mine is a gold mine located in western Guatemala, in
the Department of San Marcos, on the territory of the Maya Sipacapa
community in Sipacapa and the Maya Mam community in San Miguel
Ixtahuacán.27 Glamis Gold, a Canadian company, through its whollyowned subsidiary, Montana Exploradora, developed the mine.28 In 2006,
Glamis Gold merged with another Canadian company, Goldcorp Inc.29
Human rights violations pre-dated the merger and continued afterwards.30
The close connection between environmental damage and other human
rights violations are notable in the story of Marlin.
Although this paper focuses on a single mine, lessons from the Marlin story can be applied to many other situations. This is particularly true
considering a 2013 estimate that 75% of the world’s mining companies
are based in Canada,31 and a 2017 estimate that 65% of Canadian mining
assets are located abroad, with 70% of those assets residing in the Americas.32
A. Human Rights Abuses During Consultations
The substandard consultation process deserves mention as a foundational moment in the story of the mine as it was the basis of a number of
legal battles. Initially, the company only consulted communities in San
Miguel Ixtahuacán, despite the proximity of Sipacapa and its potential for
social impact.33 For this and other reasons, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) and the accountability mechanism of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), which in part funded the mine, concluded in
2005 that the consultation process did not adequately consider Mayan

27. See generally Simona V. Yagenova & Rocío Garcia, Indigenous People’s Struggles
Against Transnational Mining Companies in Guatemala: The Sipakapa People vs GoldCorp Mining Company, 23 SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 157, 159-60 (2009).
28. Joris van de Sandt, Mining Conflicts and Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala, CATH. ORG.
FOR RELIEF AND DEV. AID, Sept. 2009, at 19.
29. Id. at 12.
30. See, e.g., ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 198 (finding that
Montana Exploradora likely infringed mine employees’ right to association by selectively dismissing individuals that attempted to form a union).
31. Dave Dean, 75% of the World’s Mining Companies Are Based in Canada, VICE MEDIA
GRP. (Jul. 9, 2013, 1:59 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/wdb4j5/75-of-the-worlds-mining-companies-are-based-in-canada.
32. NAT. RES. CAN., MINERALS AND THE ECONOMY (2019), https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/ournatural-resources/minerals-mining/minerals-metals-facts/minerals-and-economy/20529.
33. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 8.
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customary perspectives and local decision-making norms.34 For example,
a popular consultation took place in June 2005 in Sipacapa where an absolute majority (98%) voted against the project.35 However, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court ultimately ruled that this consultation was
nonbinding,36 and the International Labour Organization (ILO) clarified
that the obligation to ensure proper consultation lies with the State and
not the company.37 Corporations, as a “class of innocents,”38 were not to
blame and the development of the Marlin Mine moved forward.
This troubled beginning demonstrates the inability of international
law to reach either private actors or MNC origin countries extraterritorially. Considering existing global inequalities that often render host States
like Guatemala unable or unwilling to properly address these problems,
the gaping hole in human rights protections, specifically for individuals
in the Global South, is clear.
B. Human Rights Violations During Mine Operations
Since the establishment of the Marlin Mine, residents have reported
skin infections, among other health problems.39 Between 2008 and 2010,
the Guatemalan Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources filed
34. COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN (CAO), ASSESSMENT OF A COMPLAINT
SUBMITTED TO CAO IN RELATION TO THE MARLIN MINING PROJECT IN GUATEMALA 32 (2005)
[hereinafter Complaint].
35. Yagenova & Garcia, supra note 27, at 160-61. See also id. at 5.
36. Yagenova & Garcia, supra note 27, at 162.
37. ON COMMON GROUND CONSULTANTS INC., supra note 3, at 5. See also BIRGITTE
FEIRING, ADVISOR INT’L LABOUR ORG., HANDBOOK FOR ILO TRIPARTITE CONSTITUENTS:
UNDERSTANDING THE INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, 1989 (No. 169), at 14
(2013).
38. Alan Freeman argues that anti-discrimination law’s focus on intentional discrimination
“creates a class of innocents, who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment when called upon to bear any
burdens in connection with remedying violations.” Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). Likewise here, corporations are
insulated from accountability despite benefitting from inequitable circumstances (here, Guatemala’s unwillingness to enforce consultation requirements, likely a result of the disproportionate
power and influence of capital from the North in the Global South). Anti-discrimination law developed to protect complicit whites – and corporate law essentially does the same, obscuring systemic
inequities that it produces and perpetuates.
39. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 20/14, Petition 1556-07, Communities of the
Sipakepense and Mam Mayan People of the Municipalities of Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán,
Guatemala, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 2014). See also Urgent Action: Crackdown on Local Citizens Opposing
Goldcorp’s “Marlin” Mine Escalates in San Marcos, Guatemala, BREAKING THE SILENCE NET
(July 18, 2008, 6:30 AM), https://www.breakingthesilencenet.blogspot.com/2008/07/urgent-actioncrackdown-on-local.html.
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three separate complaints against the mine relating to the location of the
tailings dam, a spill of toxic materials, and the unauthorized discharge of
the tailings dam.40 In May 2010, a Physicians for Human Rights study
found higher concentrations of blood lead, as well as urinary mercury,
arsenic, copper, and zinc in residents close to the mine.41 However, the
study explained that it is “not clear if the current magnitude of these elevations poses a significant threat to health,” and recommended additional
study as these impacts tend to increase with the life of the mine.42 It further detailed the harm caused to the cultural fabric of the Mam Mayan
community as a result of the environmental damage, with residents expressing fear for the future due to the pollution in the river.43 In August
2010, the NGO E-Tech International evaluated a number of studies performed on the water quality near Marlin. The report found that the water
in the tailings dam exceeded IFC guidelines for allowable concentrations
of cyanide, copper, and mercury, and that the mine’s waste had a “moderate to high potential to generate acid and leach contaminants,” posing a
risk to water resources.44
Parallel to these environmental issues, social harms also emerged.
These social harms were felt most acutely by those criminalized for their
resistance. In January 2007, community members blocked access to the
mine until Montana Exploradora agreed to meet with them; however, rather than meet and confer, seven arrest warrants were issued to individuals involved in the blockade for coercion and instigating delinquency,
among other charges.45 In February 2007, the National Civil Police forcibly removed two of the individuals for whom warrants were issued
from their homes and jailed them for three days.46 They were sentenced
40. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people, James Anaya, Observations on the situation of the rights of the indigenous
people of Guatemala with relation to the extraction projects, and other types of projects, in their
traditional territories, Hum. Rts. Council, 18th Sess., ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.3 (June 7,
2011).
41. NILADRI BASU & HOWARD HU, TOXIC METALS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES NEAR THE
MARLIN MINE IN WESTERN GUATEMALA: POTENTIAL EXPOSURES AND IMPACTS ON HEALTH 3,
15 (Susannah Sirkin ed., 2010).
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 16.
44. ANN MAEST & DICK KAMP, EVALUATION OF PREDICTED AND ACTUAL WATER QUALITY
CONDITIONS AT THE MARLIN MINE, GUATEMALA 6-7 (2010).
45. John Ahni Schertow, Trial of “Goldcorp 7” Continues in Guatemala,
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY (Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.intercontinentalcry.org/trial-of-goldcorp7-continues-in-guatemala/.
46. James Rodriguez, Mina de oro agrava situación social, DEGUATE (Jul. 19, 2007, 8:21
AM), https://www.deguate.com/artman/publish/article_10762.shtml.
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to two years of probation and a fine, while the other five individuals were
acquitted of all charges.47 In June 2008, arrest warrants were issued
against eight women who also actively opposed the mine.48 These incidents illustrate how a host State’s judiciary can be used to further the
interests of private actors from the Global North. Once again, this demonstrates the pressing need for MNCs’ home States to play a role in protecting human rights.
Important moments in the subsequent seven years of mine operation
include: a 2010 order from the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to cease mine operations, later revised to only require Guatemala
to ensure that residents had potable water;49 a 2012 visit to the Marlin site
by a number of Canadian Members of Parliament (on Goldcorp’s dime);50
and a 2014 determination by the Inter-American Commission for Human
Rights that the petition of the Sipacapa and Mam Mayan communities
against Guatemala was admissible on the basis of violations to their rights
of, inter alia, consultation, equal protection, and the progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights.51 Production at Marlin
ceased in May 2017, and Marlin became the first commercial mine in
Guatemala to undergo a formal closure process.52
C. Remedies Sought in Guatemala During the Mine’s Operation
Guatemala did not offer many remedies during the mine’s operation.
In 2007, the NGO Madreselva sought an amparo, a kind of injunction, on
behalf of the Sipacapa community against a number of Guatemalan government agencies for issuing a mining license without proper consultation
as required by ILO 169.53 The Constitutional Court not only denied the
amparo, but also fined the attorneys that represented Madreselva for
47. John Ahni Schertow, Goldcorp 7 Verdict is In. . . Justice in Guatemala?,
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.intercontinentalcry.org/goldcorp-7-verdict
-is-injustice-in-guatemala/.
48. Report No. 20/14, supra note 39, ¶ 22.
49. Precautionary Measures: PM 260-07 - Communities of the Maya People (Sipakepense and
Mam) of the Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos,
Guatemala, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp?Year
=2010&Country=GTM (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
50. Jen Moore, Goldcorp Organizes Junket to Guatemala for Canadian Parliamentarians,
MINING WATCH CAN. (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.miningwatch.ca/news/2012/8/28/goldcorp-organizes-junket-guatemala-canadian-parliamentarians.
51. Report No. 20/14, supra note 39, ¶ 14.
52. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 6.
53. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Jan. 9, 2008, En Calidad de Tribunal
Extraordinario de Amparo, Expediente 123-2007, Amparo en Unica Instancia, p. 1-2 (Guat.).
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presenting a “notoriously improper” amparo.54 This is particularly disturbing considering that in 2005, Montana Exploradora itself sought an
amparo against the municipality of Sipacapa, asking the Constitutional
Court to find the community consultation unconstitutional.55 It found the
consultation non-binding, but not unconstitutional – and no fines were
imposed on those lawyers.56
This illustrates that, although in theory, Guatemala could act to protect communities such as the Sipacapa and Mam Mayan communities, in
practice it cannot. Canada, on the other hand, is able to influence operations abroad to a much greater extent.57 Establishing comprehensive and
effective regulations in Canada on mining and mine closure abroad would
fill this long-ignored (and arguably built-in) gap in international human
rights law. Legal developments that focus on the responsibility of States
that domicile corporations, as will be discussed further, can help ensure
that the blanket obscuring of deeply rooted global inequities cannot continue to insulate beneficiaries of the system from accountability.
D. Human Rights Violations Arising from Mine Closure
Guatemala’s mining laws did not regulate closure when Marlin shut
down in 2017.58 A month after Marlin’s closure, Goldcorp released a report indicating that it had fulfilled the majority of its human rights commitments arising from the 2010 On Common Ground report.59 Goldcorp
approved a $75 million budget for closure, not including severance payments or post-closure monitoring, which it estimated would amount to

54. Id. at 7-8.
55. Corte de Constitucionalidad [Constitutional Court], Feb. 28, 2008, Expedientes
Acumulados 1643-2005 y 1654-2005, Apelacion de Sentencia en Amparo, p. 1, (Guat.).
56. Id. at 8-9. For more on domestic remedies pursued in Guatemala, see Raquel Aldana,
Transforming Students, Transforming Self: The Power of Teaching Social Justice Struggles in Context, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 53, 69-71 (2011).
57. Canadian Embassies, for example, are generally involved in facilitating the work of Canadian firms operating abroad. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent
Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, at 45-46, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 47/15 (Dec. 31, 2015).
58. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 16-17. See also Montana Exploradora de Guatemala, S.A., MINA MARLIN: PLAN DE CIERRE [MARLIN MINE CLOSURE PLAN] 7-9 (2017),
https://www.newmont-marlin.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Plan-de-Cierre-Mina-MarlinMEM.pdf. (outlining the various applicable national and legal standards for mining in Guatemala
generally, with no mention of specific closure standards).
59. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 6.
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$11 million.60 How much Goldcorp would pay for closure did not proceed
without controversy.61
What this money actually goes to (assuming it is allocated appropriately)62 is unclear, since the government of Guatemala continues to insist
that the infrastructural damage in the area was not due to the mine.63 This
infrastructural damage includes cracked homes, bridges, and roads.64 In
addition, the social divisions between those who supported the mine and
those who opposed it also persists, eroding trust and a sense of community responsibility.65

60. Id. at 19.
61. In 2010 Goldcorp posted a $1 million bond with the Guatemalan government for unanticipated costs. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 19. In 2012 it agreed to post an additional $27
million after Rob Robinson, an American mine and environmental engineer, presented a shareholder resolution together with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee to Goldcorp urging
an increased bond amount in light of his estimate that the actual closure costs would be $49 million.
Communities Shouldn’t Pay To Clean Up Goldcorp’s Mess in Central America, MINING WATCH
CAN. (June 15, 2012, 3:42 PM), https://www.miningwatch.ca/blog/2012/6/15/communitiesshouldn-t-pay-clean-goldcorp-s-mess-central-america;
AMBER
MOULTON,
UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST SERV. COMM., DEFENDING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A DECADE OF
SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL WATER JUSTICE 23 (2015), http://www.uusc.org/sites/default/files/human
_right_to_water_retrospective.pdf. See also KEITH CAMPBELL ET AL., ASUNTOS DE
RECUPERACIÓN Y COSTOS APROXIMADOS PARA LA RECUPERACIÓN DE LA MINA MARLIN,
COPAE & UUSC 9 (Molly Butler, Maria J. Van Der Maaten, H. Alejandro Alfaro Santiz, trans.,
2010), https://www.goldcorpoutofguatemala.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/reclamation-issues-and
-estimated-cost-of-reclamation-marlin-mine.pdf.
62. It is important to note here the close relationship of the Guatemalan elite with the development of mining projects. For example, Oscar Berger, President of Guatemala from 2004 to 2008,
was an important supporter of the development of mining, and particularly the Marlin Mine. His
cousin, Francois Berger, was married to Maria Eugenia Novella de Berger. During Serrano Elías’
administration in the early 90s, Novella was essential in the naming of Milton Estuardo Saravia
Rodríguez as the Executive Secretary of the National Council of Protected Areas, a role for which
many believed he was not qualified. Saravia Rodríguez later became the general manager of Montana Exploradora, responsible for the Marlin Mine. See Luis Solano, La transnacionalización de la
industria extractiva: la captura de los recursos minerales e hidrocarburos, 4 EL OBSERVADOR 19,
June – July 2009, at 3, 26, https://www.issuu.com/observadorguatemala/docs/el_observador_no._
19_hunio_2009; DIEGO PADILLA VASSAUX, POLÍTICA DEL AGUA EN GUATEMALA: UNA
CADIOGRAFÍA CRÍTICA DEL ESTADO 7 n.65 (Cara Parens ed., 2019), https://www.plaza
publica.com.gt/sites/default/files/digital_politica_del_agua_en_guatemala.pdf.
63. Según Conred, daños a casas no fueron por actividad minera, LA HORA (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.lahora.gt/segun-conred-danos-a-casas-no-fueron-por-actividad-minera/.
64. Frente de Defensa San Miguelense, supra note 4, at 9. See also Fredemi San Miguel
(@fredemi.sanmiguel), FACEBOOK (Feb. 16, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.facebook.com/fredemi.sanmiguel/videos/1982969668622086/.
65. Jeff Abbott, Something in the water: The lasting violence of a Canadian mining company
in Guatemala, (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/something-inthe-water. An extreme example of the social divisions that mine closure can have is the Fénix mine
in Izabal, Guatemala. In 2019 the Guatemala Constitutional Court granted an injunction to a union
of fishermen who alleged the mine was opened without proper consultation and had created
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The current environmental harm and future risks are serious. Water
has been an ongoing issue; residents note that 28 sources of water have
dried up.66 Rob Robinson, an American mining and environmental engineer who investigated Marlin’s closure, highlights other environmental
risks including the tailings dam leaking (which would likely be toxic
since cyanide was used to dissolve gold from ore), water entering the
open pit and carrying toxic material into groundwater, and erosion during
heavy rains due to the steep slopes of the rock dump.67 Montana Exploradora will monitor the site until 2026,68 although Robinson concludes
that monitoring for at least thirty years, rather than ten, is necessary to
mitigate the risks outlined above.69
Goldcorp has been quiet on the closure process, discreetly acknowledging for example that “[m]ine closure, reclamation and remediation
costs for environmental liabilities may exceed the provisions we have
made,” mentioning, among others, an unnamed closed mine site in Guatemala, in its 2020 SEC 10-K filing.70 This may be a standard risk disclosure, but that’s not all it says about Guatemala. It also specifically cites
community opposition to the Marlin Mine and the 2010 Inter-American
environmental damage. This led community members who supported the mine to file a request for
provisional measures from the Inter-American Commission, alleging that the closure and resulting
loss of economic opportunities was a violation of their economic, social and cultural rights. The
Covid-19 pandemic impeded the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s injunction. CIDH y
las presencias de ONU Derechos Humanos reiteran su llamado para la creación de un ambiente
propicio y seguro para quienes defienden los derechos humanos en la región, ORG. OF AM. STATES
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2019/288.asp; Natiana Gándara,
Mina de níquel acudirá a Corte Interamericana por cierre de operación en Guatemala, PRENSA
LIBRE (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.prensalibre.com/economia/mina-fenix-representantes-detrabajadores-y-empresarios-acudiran-a-la-cidh/. See also Pobladores de El Estor solicitan medidas
cautelares ante la CIDH por suspensión de Mina Fénix, IMPACTO.GT (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.impacto.gt/pobladores-de-el-estor-solicitan-medidas-cautelares-ante-la-cidh-por-suspension-de-mina-fenix; Solicitarán medidas cautelares por cierre de proyecto minero Fénix,
MININGWORKS.GT (Aug. 6, 2019), http://www.miningworks.gt/mineria-responsable/cgnsolicitara-medidas-cautelares-ante-la-cidh-por-suspension-de-actividades-en-mina-fenix/;
Jody
García (@JodyNomada), TWITTER (July 25, 2019, 11:23 AM), https://www.twitter.com
/i/status/1154427031016394752; Anna-Catherine Brigida, Una polémica mina de níquel de
Guatemala “ignora el confinamiento por coronavirus”, MONGABAY (Aug. 28, 2021), https://
www.es.mongabay.com/2020/08/una-polemica-mina-de-niquel-de-guatemala-ignora-elconfinamiento-por-coronavirus/.
66. Abbott, supra note 65, at 8. See also, San Miguel, supra note 64.
67. Robert H. Robinson, Presenter at Special Session: Legal Strategies to Address Goldcorp’s
Marlin Mine Closure, Workshop of the Centre for Indigenous Conservation and Development Alternatives held at McGill University (June 20, 2018) (slides on file with author).
68. BUS. FOR SOC. RESP., supra note 4, at 7.
69. Robinson, supra note 67.
70. Newmont Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 20, 2020). Newmont bought Goldcorp in 2019. Id. at 5.
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Commission order to close the mine. Goldcorp even cited that “evolving
expectations related to human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental protections may result in opposition to our current and future operations. . . Opposition by community and activist groups to our operations
may require modification of, or preclude the operation or development
of, our projects and mines or may require us to enter into agreements with
such groups or local governments.”71
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ON MINE CLOSURE
Despite an increasing focus on State responsibility vis-à-vis private
actors based in those countries,72 international law does not offer specific
guidance on mine closure.73 The existing guidelines focus on encouraging
effective domestic legislation.74 However, a limited number of domestic
jurisdictions effectively regulate mine closure, such as Canada where individual provinces manage mining regulation within their territories.75
For this reason, establishing international responsibility in relation to
mine closure is imperative. I argue that existing human rights law creates
obligations for home States of MNCs that engage in mine closure abroad.
In the universal human rights system, the ICESCR is an important
instrument from which such responsibility can be derived. The Economic
and Social Council, the treaty body of the ICESCR, specifically addresses
the role of private actors in guaranteeing human rights in General Comment 24.76 It confirmed that:
[e]xtraterritorial obligations arise when a State party may influence situations located outside its territory . . . by controlling the activities of corporations domiciled in its territory
71. Id. at 24.
72. See, e.g., U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. [OHCHR], Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTER. (2011).
73. A. Morrison-Saunders et al., Integrating Mine Closure Planning with Environmental Impact Assessment:Challenges and Opportunities Drawn from African and Australian Practice, 34
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 117, 118 (2016) (discussing international industry
expectations rather than firm guidance).
74. See CHRISTOPHER G. SHELDON ET AL., IT’S NOT OVER WHEN IT’S OVER: MINE CLOSURE
AROUND THE WORLD 10 (2002); GANKHUYAG & GREGOIRE, supra note 5, at 420.
75. ALLEN L. CLARK & JENNIFER COOK CLARK, AN INTERNATIONAL OVERVIEW OF LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS FOR MINE CLOSURE 67 (2005); Vivoda et al., supra note 5, at 10. See, e.g., The
Mines and Minerals Act, Mine Closure Regulation, C.C.S.M. 67/99 (Can.).
76. U.N, Econ. & Soc. Council, Gen. Comment No. 24 on State Obligations Under the Int’l
Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. in the Context of Bus. Activities ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/24 (Aug. 10, 2017).
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and/or under its jurisdiction, and thus may contribute to the
effective enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights
outside its national territory.77
This was not the first time this duty was clarified. In 2011, the Economic and Social Council published a statement on the obligations of
States regarding the corporate sector.78 In addition, the Economic and Social Council has previously affirmed the ICESCR’s extraterritorial application with regards to the right to health,79 and the right to water,80 both
relevant here. As such, States’ responsibility to prevent third parties over
which they exercise influence from violating the economic, social, and
cultural rights of individuals outside their territories is not new.81
Canada is a party to the ICESCR, but not its Optional Protocol,
which allows the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to
receive communications from individuals alleging violations of rights
protected by the ICESCR.82 Nonetheless, as a party to the ICESCR, Canada is obligated to provide periodic reports to the Committee every five
years.83 The Committee then provides concluding observations in response to these periodic reports.

77. Id. ¶ 28.
78. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the
Corp. Sector and Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (July 12, 2011).
79. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l
Covenant of Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) (“To
comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have to respect
the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating
the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law”).
80. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l
Covenant of Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“Steps
should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the
right to water of individuals and communities in other countries”).
81. More recently, in relation to the right to life as guaranteed in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 36
made clear that States must take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that all activities taking place in whole or in part within their territory and in other places subject to their jurisdiction, but having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals
outside their territory, including activities taken by corporate entities based in their territory or
subject to their jurisdiction, are consistent with Article 6 [of the ICCPR]. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019) (citations omitted).
82. G.A. Res. 63/117, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2008).
83. See Canada’s Appearance at the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/canada-unitednations-system/reports-united-nations-treaties/commitments-economic-social-cultural-rights/canada-appearance.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
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Canada’s next periodic report is upcoming, as its last report was
made in 2016.84 On that occasion, the Committee noted its concern “that
the conduct of corporations registered or domiciled in the State party and
operating abroad is, on occasion, negatively impacting on the enjoyment
of Covenant rights by local populations.”85 It recommended that Canada
strengthen legislation governing such operations, including requiring human rights impact assessments prior to initiating projects, establishing
more robust and effective mechanisms to receive complaints, and facilitating justice in local courts for victims of such abuses.86
In the concluding observations of periodic reports issued since the
release of General Comment 24, the Committee has consistently recommended that States in the Global North adopt a legal framework that requires businesses domiciled in each State to exercise human rights diligence, allows businesses in violation of ESC rights to be held liable, and
enables victims to seek remedies domestically.87 However, the procedures available against Canada by means of the ICESCR are limited due
to its non-ratification of the Optional Protocol. This again is a symptom
of how international law is built and applied by powerful States to limit
the justiciability of certain abuses. Even so, the Committee’s interpretation of the ICESCR clearly establishes the expectation in international
human rights law that countries exert their influence over private actors
that are domiciled in their state when such influence can limit or remedy
human rights abuses abroad, an obligation that should extend to mine closure. This is a step towards cracking the international human rights system’s resistance to addressing these kinds of abuses.
V. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND MINE
CLOSURE
Rights surrounding mine closure have yet to be addressed by the Inter-American system, but relevant rights and responsibilities can be derived from existing sources. In 2017, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights took a monumental step forward in recognizing environmental
84. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of
Canada, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 (Mar. 23, 2016).
85. Id. ¶ 15.
86. Id. ¶ 16.
87. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of
Belgium ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BEL/CO/5 (Mar. 25, 2020); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Switzerland ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/CHE/CO/4 (Nov. 18, 2019); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Concluding Observations on the
Sixth Periodic Report of Denmark ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DNK/CO/6 (Nov. 12, 2019).
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rights when it issued Advisory Opinion 23, which places the right to a
healthy environment squarely within the framework of economic, social
and cultural rights as contemplated in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights.88 The Advisory Opinion goes even further by
saying that States must “take measures to prevent significant damage to
the environment, within or outside their territory.”89
This important development reflects the “evolving expectations related to human rights”90 that Goldcorp alluded to. However, in the context
of the Marlin Mine and similar situations, a number of dots must be connected for this development to make a difference in practice, including
the applicability of the Convention to non-parties such as Canada and its
extraterritorial application.
A. The American Convention and Non-Party OAS States
A majority of the States which form the Organization for American
States (OAS) have signed the American Convention on Human Rights,
on which Advisory Opinion 23 is based. However, a number have not –
most notably, the United States and Canada. Accordingly, holding accountable a host State, such as Canada in the Marlin context, which has
conveniently insulated itself from accountability, becomes challenging.
Nonetheless, there may be a way forward. This framework leaves two
links that must be established, the first easier than the second: (1) whether
petitions can be lodged against a non-party to the Convention; and (2)
whether a right read into the Convention can indicate an obligation for
non-parties. I propose the answer to both is yes.
The Inter-American system does offer some accountability for the
actions of OAS States that have not ratified the Convention. Although
only those States that have ratified the Convention fall under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, all OAS States are
held to their obligations in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, and thus subject to procedures under the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.91 Article 20 of the Commission’s Statute
88. Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in Relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23 ¶ 57
(Nov. 15, 2017).
89. Id. ¶ 140 (emphasis added).
90. Newmont Corp., supra note 70, at 24.
91. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.85, doc. 25 at 9 (1994).
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empowers the Commission to examine communications and request information from a non-party OAS State and make recommendations to
that State “in order to bring about more effective observance of fundamental human rights.”92 Likewise, Article 51 of the Commission’s Regulations empowers the Commission to “receive and examine any petition
that contains a denunciation of alleged violations of the human rights set
forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,” specifically in relation to OAS States not a party to the Convention.93 The
jurisdiction of the Commission to examine petitions against such States
is no longer seriously questioned.
The next step, then, is finding the link between the Convention rights
cited in Advisory Opinion 23, and the American Declaration, on which
any petition against Canada must be based. This is a weaker point than
the first in this legal patchwork, but I argue that the right recognized in
Advisory Opinion 23 can be found in Article XIII of the American Declaration.
First, by the Opinion’s own language, the right to a healthy environment can be read into Article 26 of the American Convention because it
already exists in the OAS Charter and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.94 Specifically, it cites Articles 30, 31, 33, and
34 of the OAS Charter, which establishes the obligation of States to
achieve the integral development of their peoples.95 Integral developments means the promotion of sustainable development, which has an
environmental dimension.96 The American Declaration, in turn, “contains
and defines those human rights essential to which the Charter refers.”97
Thus, since the Convention derives its meaning from these two underlying documents, non-parties to the Convention can still be held to the obligations set forth in the Advisory Opinion by virtue of their ratification
of the OAS Charter rather than based on the Convention.

92. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, vol. 1 at 88 (1979), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1, at
93 (1992), available at http://www.hrlibrary.umn.edu/oasinstr/zoas4cms.htm.
93. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc.6 rev.1,
at 103 (1992), available at http://www.hrlibrary.umn.edu/oasinstr/zoas5cmr.htm.
94. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 57.
95. Id. at 26 n.85.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶ 57.
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Second, previous determinations of the Commission support this
reading. Although the relationship between the environment and human
rights has not previously been the subject of an Advisory Opinion issued
by the Inter-American Court, the relationship has been addressed by the
Commission.
In fact, allegations of the destruction of the environment and natural
resources have been lodged against Canada in the past.98 The
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group alleged that starting in the 19th century their
lands were transferred by force to third parties without consultation or
compensation.99 While the petitioners continued to hunt, fish, and gather
food on their ancestral lands, increased concessions to third parties in
light of the 2010 Winter Olympics and subsequent felling of forests and
other environmental damage severely impeded their ability to pursue
these activities.100 These activities are essential to preserving their culture
and way of life.101 On these facts, the Commission found that the destruction of the environment and natural resources, and its impact on the
Hul’qumi’num culture and way of life, characterized violations of Article
XIII of the American Declaration, which protects the right to the benefits
of culture.102 Thus, the obligation to protect the environment, as outlined
by Advisory Opinion 23, codified the pre-existing obligations of OAS
States that are non-parties to the Convention.103
Canada has an obligation to protect the environment in terms of economic, social, and cultural rights on the basis of the OAS Charter and the
Declaration. The mechanisms for accountability are more limited under
the Declaration than under the Convention, a symptom of powerful
States’ ability to circumvent international responsibility. Nonetheless,
this obligation exists and the increased attention to this issue is a promising step forward in addressing abuses that might arise from mine closures
abroad.

98. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 105/09, Petition 592-07, Hul’qumi’num Treaty
Group v. Canada, (Oct. 30, 2009).
99. Id. ¶ 10.
100. Id. ¶ 11.
101. Id. ¶ 12.
102. Id. ¶ 53.
103. The Commission itself has signaled the importance of the intersection between the environment and economic, social and cultural rights, by creating in 2017 (prior to the Opinion) the
position of Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights. IACHR
Chooses Soledad García Muñoz as Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights (ESCER), ORG. OF AM. STATES (July 5, 2017), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2017/090.asp.
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B. Extraterritorial Application
Applying this obligation in the Marlin context, and likely many others, creates another two-step analysis: (1) whether the obligations of OAS
non-parties to the Convention applies extraterritorially; and (2) if so,
whether this obligation still applies in the case of third parties operating
abroad, rather than operations of the State itself.
Again, the first question is easier to answer. In the Advisory Opinion, the Court notes that jurisdiction is not limited to acts carried out
within the territory of the State in question.104 The Court cites a number
of admissible cases where the respondent State has carried out military
operations outside its territory.105 In particular, it cites two cases that
came before the Commission in which the U.S. was the respondent
State:106 Caso Coard, dealing with U.S. military intervention in Grenada;107 and Salas, dealing with U.S. military intervention in Panama.108
Neither report addresses extraterritorial application directly, but the Commission in Coard, for example, roundly rejects the U.S. assertion that
U.S. military action in Grenada is not subject to the Commission’s examination, concluding that the facts characterize a violation of a human right
and thus provided a basis for admissibility.109 This reading of jurisdiction
represents a crack in the human rights system that, at times, protects abusers on the basis of jurisdiction.110
The inclusion of these two cases in the Advisory Opinion also suggests that the Opinion’s conclusions on extraterritoriality implicate nonparties to the Convention. The Salas merits report, issued after the Opinion, makes this explicit. The report explained that in assessing the scope
of the Declaration, the Commission must ascertain “whether there is a
104. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 78.
105. Id. ¶ 79.
106. Id.
107. Coard, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94 at 1.
108. Salas v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 31/93,
OEA/Ser.L./V/I.85, doc. 9 (1993).
109. Coard, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 14/94 at 11.
110. The U.S. position on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for
example, is that its requirement that States protect the rights of “all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction,” should be read conjunctively – that is, an individual must be both
within U.S. territory and subject to its jurisdiction in order for an obligation to arise. Memorandum
Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of State, Off. of the Legal Adviser (Oct. 19, 2010). This is despite clear guidance from the
Human Rights Committee that the clause should be read disjunctively. Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); Beth Van Schaack, The
United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is
the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20 (2014).
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causal connection between the extraterritorial conduct of a state through
the actions or omissions of its agents . . . and the alleged violation of the
right . . . .”111Although the Commission does not directly cite the Opinion, it uses much of the same language from the Opinion. Such use avoids
the question of the direct applicability of the Court’s Advisory Opinion
on the Commission, but effectively sets forth a parallel standard for nonparty States.112
Both Coard and Salas concerned military activities, but in the Opinion the Court clarifies that military situations are not the only instances
where extraterritorial jurisdiction may apply.113 This issue leads into the
second question – whether home States are responsible for acts of their
non-State actors. Although the Opinion was ground-breaking in setting
forth the inclusion of environmental rights that are protected by the InterAmerican system, the Court takes a quieter but equally significant step
forward in discussing extraterritoriality. It broadens the concept of extraterritoriality, concluding that a State is responsible for activities carried
out outside its territory if the State “exercises a[n] effective control over
the activities.”114 Thus, it establishes a causality requirement between an
act or omission of the State and the human rights violation.115 Again, this
is almost precisely the language used by the Commission in the Salas
merit report,116 indicating that this standard is applicable to non-party
States.
111. Sala Galindo v. United States, Case 10.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 121/18,
OEA/Ser. L/V/II.169, doc. 138 ¶ 314 (2019). In a 2020 report on a case involving extradition to the
U.S., the Commission again stated that “States have the duty to respect the rights of all persons
within its territory and of those present in the territory of another State but subject to the control of
its agent. . . [I]t is necessary to determine whether there is a causal nexus between the extraterritorial
conduct of a State through the acts or omissions of its agents and/or of persons who have acted
under its command or acquiescence, and the alleged violation of the rights and freedoms of a person.” Nelson Ivan Serrano Saenz v. United States, Case 13.356, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 200/20, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 214 at 48 (2020) (finding that Ecuadorian officers who arrested
the petitioner were acting as U.S. agents because a U.S. special agent present in Ecuador in his
official capacity orchestrated the arrest). The Commission had previously addressed the extraterritorial application of the Declaration, requiring victims be subject to the control of the other state
through the acts of its agents. Djamel Ameziane v. United States, Petition Judgment, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 17/12, ¶ 30 (2012).
112. The Commission’s hesitance to pronounce the Advisory Opinions directly applicable to
non-party States is understandable – it avoids protests of non-parties to being held responsible to a
Convention they never signed, while at the same time properly developing a strong parallel jurisprudence based on the Declaration.
113. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶¶ 79-80.
114. Id. ¶ 104(h).
115. Id. ¶ 103.
116. See Galindo, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 121/18, ¶ 314.
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The Opinion is broad in its description of the causality test,117 but it
does contemplate a situation in which the actions or omissions of a State
in relation to a MNC incorporated in that State are causally connected to
a human rights violation abroad.118 The Court refers to such a situation
when it notes that States have the obligation to prevent human rights violations by private third-parties.119 This responsibility could stem from a
State failing to regulate, supervise, or investigate such actors.120 In terms
of regulation, the Court considers that States must regulate activities that
might cause “significant damage” to the environment.121 Specifically, it
cites the “positive tendency” in international human rights law to protect
human rights in situations of MNCs operating abroad.122 The Court’s pronouncements on the issue are a positive development, although one that
is yet to be clearly defined.123
The missing link here, then, is whether the piece relating to third
parties will be applicable to non-party States on the basis of the Declaration. The Salas merits report did not have an occasion to address this issue, as the basis of the allegations was military activity. The Commission
addressed this issue in its 2015 report on the extractive sector and indigenous and afro-descendant peoples, recognizing the increasing pressure
to hold origin countries accountable, without pronouncing on the issue.124
In 2019, the Commission signaled more pointedly that such extraterritorial jurisdiction may exist based on the Declaration. In its report on
business and human rights, it replicated the language of regulation, supervision, and investigation used in the Opinion, noting that this act or
omission can be analyzed on the basis of the general obligation to protect
117. Antal Berkes, A New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link Recognised by the IACtHR,
EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-linkrecognised-by-the-iacthr/.
118. Id.
119. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, supra note 88, ¶ 118.
120. Id. ¶ 119.
121. Id. ¶ 149.
122. Id. ¶ 151.
123. Berkes, supra note 117.
124. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 47/15 ¶ 80 (Dec. 31, 2015). The Commission addressed the
issue again in 2017 in a report on Poverty and Human Rights, noting that a state must protect against
human rights abuses carried out “‘within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises.’” Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report on Poverty and Human Rights in the
Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.164, doc. 147, at 248 (Sept. 7, 2017), citing Case of the Kaliña y Lokono
Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No.
309, ¶ 248 (Nov. 25, 2015).
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human rights as outlined in the Convention “and other applicable InterAmerican instruments.”125 Ultimately, the report does not dwell much on
the issue of parties who have not ratified the Convention and their responsibility vis-à-vis MNCs operating abroad. Yet, through these reports the
Commission has signaled its openness to this kind of extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. Again, these advances indicate
cracks in the walls of international human rights law as it was established.
In these Parts, I’ve set forth the links within the Inter-American system that would recognize Canada’s responsibility for the environmental
harm resulting from the closure of the Marlin Mine. Specifically, a parallel to the environmental rights set forth in the Advisory Opinion can
likely be found in the American Declaration, and therefore the Commission is empowered to examine petitions against non-parties to the Convention on that basis. Further, the fact that the harm has occurred abroad
as a result of the activities of a third party is not an obstacle.
VI. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR CANADA
This exploration of universal and regional human rights law indicates that Canada likely has a responsibility to regulate, supervise, and
investigate corporations responsible for abuses during mine closures
abroad. The ICESCR requirements that States exercise human rights diligence, hold corporations liable for violations of ESC rights, and provide
remedies to victims track closely with the Inter-American Commission
for Human Rights requirements.
This responsibility would require Canada to adopt a framework governing mine closures abroad. Although for Marlin the time has passed for
initial diligence, for future mine sites, this responsibility may mean developing a regulatory framework that requires companies to provide detailed closure plans during the early stages of development that are responsive to environmental and social risks specific to the community in
which the mine will operate. For example, the Initiative for Responsible
Mining Assurance proposes standards for closure plans that include the
role of affected communities in reviewing the plan, the disposal of hazardous materials, long-term maintenance and monitoring, and a detailed
determination of the costs of closure.126 The responsibility to regulate and
supervise would require monitoring Canadian corporations for
125. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Informe Empresas y Derechos Humanos: Estándares
Interamericanos, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, CIDH/REDESCA/INF.1/19 ¶ 153 (Nov. 1, 2019).
126. INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING ASSURANCE, IRMA STANDARD FOR RESPONSIBLE
MINING IRMA-STD-001 70-71 (2018).
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compliance with these regulations in their mine closure operations. Here,
although the nexus requirement for finding origin State responsibility is
broad, as described by the Economic and Social Council,127 with time the
Court128 and the Commission129 will have more opportunities to address
this issue, and this area of law will continue to grow. Considering the
trajectory so far, Canada would do well to assume that further development on the nexus requirement will not significantly narrow instances of
responsibility.
In relation to the responsibility of investigating and bringing corporations to justice, a judicial or administrative mechanism for holding corporations liable for damage resulting from improper closure will likely
be required, in addition to providing remedies for victims of these violations. Communities and advocates have certainly attempted to pursue
remedies in Canadian and U.S. courts for the abuses of mining corporations incorporated in those States.130 The Supreme Court of Canada emitted a decision in 2020 in a case concerning Nevsun Resources, in which
there were allegations that Nevsun’s agents perpetrated atrocities, including slavery, in its operations in Eritrea.131 The Supreme Court of Canada
held that Nevsun could be sued in Canada, since customary international
law is part of Canadian law and it is not “plain and obvious” that the
Eritrean workers’ claims could not succeed.132 This was not a decision on
the merits of the case, and considering the barriers to accessing this kind
of justice, new legislation would likely be needed for Canada to fulfill its
127. E/C.12/GC/24, supra note 76, ¶ 28.
128. See Berkes, supra note 117.
129. See Informe Empresas y Derechos Humanos: Estándares Interamericanos, supra note 125,
¶ 152.
130. In the U.S., a case against Newmont Mining Corporation alleging that its agents violently
dispossessed inhabitants of land acquired by the company for gold exploration is moving its way
through the judiciary. Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. CV 17-1315, 2020 WL
1154783 at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2020). The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision
granting Newmont’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Peru is the more appropriate forum. Id. at
*13; Acuna-Atalaya v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 20-1765 (3d Cir. Dec. 11, 2020).
131. Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya [2020], 5 S.C.R. (Can.).
132. Id. ¶ 132. [M]odern international human rights law [is] the phoenix that rose from the
ashes of World War II and declared global war on human rights abuses. Its mandate was to prevent
breaches of internationally accepted norms. Those norms were not meant to be theoretical aspirations or legal luxuries, but moral imperatives and legal necessities. Conduct that undermined the
norms was to be identified and addressed. Id. ¶ 1. This is not the first time individuals harmed by
Canadian mining companies abroad have sought remedy in Canada. See Chilenye Nwapi, Resource
Extraction in the Courtroom: The Significance of Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc for Transnational
Justice in Canada, 14 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 121, 150 (2014) (“Hudbay is significant
in at least three respects: (1) its jurisdictional use of the direct liability theory; (2) its attempt to
enunciate a novel duty of care; and (3) good lawyering”).

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2021]

8/16/21 8:01 PM

A Cielo Abierto

181

human rights responsibility of providing a remedy to victims of human
rights violations as a result of mine closures.133
The developments in international human rights law outlined here
indicate Canada has the responsibility to develop robust legislation regulating mine closures, enforce these regulations, and create effective avenues for victims’ pursuit of remedies. This process will help remove the
deception of global equality and provide justice for those previously written out of human rights protections.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mine closure is by no means the end. Rather, it is an epilogue that
desperately needs to be told. The Marlin Mine is an emblematic example
of the problems in regulating and providing accountability for the operations of MNCs that close mines abroad. In the preceding parts, I outline
the developments within the universal human rights system, showing that
the ICESCR likely requires States to put in place frameworks that can
hold MNCs liable for damage resulting from mine closures, and provide
remedies to victims. Next, I explore a similar progression within the Inter-American system, connecting the dots between environmental rights,
the responsibilities of OAS States that have not signed the American Convention, and the extraterritorial applicability of these obligations to private actors. These are powerful steps forward, but they are by no means
enough.
Although I argue that space has opened in the Inter-American and
universal systems for the kind of accountability needed in the Marlin context and others similar to it, the patchwork required to reach this point is
indicative of the ways that international law has built-in protections for
powerful States in the Global North that are complicit in the abuses
against communities in the Global South. Enforcement of human rights
133. There are three mechanisms within Canada for accountability for human rights violations
abroad, aside from civil litigation like Nevsun and the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
They are the Canadian Corporate Social Responsibility Framework (now defunct), the National
Contact Point, and the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE) announced in
2018. JUSTICE AND CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, RESPONSIBILITY OF CANADA FOR
ACTIONS OF CANADIAN COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICA (2018). In the Marlin context, petitioners
attempted to address the Canadian National Contact Point pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Frente de Defensa San Miguelense, supra note 4, at 4 (The contact point
in its final statement recommended the parties engage in dialogue and closed the instance).
CANADIAN NATIONAL CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES FINAL STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN NATIONAL CONTACT POINT ON THE
NOTIFICATION DATED DECEMBER 9, 2009, CONCERNING THE MARLIN MINE IN GUATEMALA,
PURSUANT TO THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (May 3, 2011).
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law is difficult, since ultimately the responsibility is with States to honor
their human rights obligations.134 For example, the problem of extraterritorial application persists, in part because powerful States can otherwise
rely on borders, a “technolog[y] of racialized exclusion,”135 to insulate
themselves from accountability for these abuses. A human rights framework focused on the State, rather than non-State actors such as MNCs
and the home States that enable their activity, impedes accountability by
obscuring inequalities. This means that companies, with the indirect and
sometimes direct support of their origin States, can carry out racialized
human rights abuses with few avenues for accountability. Nevertheless,
the fact that the universal and Inter-American systems have expanded
possibilities for environmental protection and the extraterritorial application of human rights laws are rays of light in the open pit of international
human rights law.

134. For this reason, other forums, such as international criminal law, should be explored. See
Christopher St. Martin, Criminalize It: A Proper Means of Addressing Environmental Abuses Perpetrated by Multinational Corporations in the Extractive Industry, 28 GEO. ENV’TL. L. REV. 107,
128 (2015).
135. See, e.g., Tendai Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV 1509, 1530-31
(2019) (“[B]ecause of the persisting racial demographics that distinguish the First World from the
Third—demographics that are, in significant part, a product of passports, national borders, and
other successful institutions that partially originated as technologies of racialized exclusion — most
whites enjoy dramatically greater rights to freedom of international movement (by which I mean
travel across borders) than most nonwhites. The reality is that the mortal cost of international mobility is largely a nonwhite problem”).

